
Summaries

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S COLUMN

How to survive in the changed security situation

MART RAUDSAAR

Editor-in-chief of Riigikogu toimetised

Security is the focus topic of the new issue of *Riigikogu Toimetised*. As the members of the Riigikogu who participated in the Riigikogu Toimetised conversation circle found, security cannot be divided into external and internal security any more, and there are new aspects in it due to global developments. This is why we can say without exaggeration that security involves all fields of life. Besides war, it is also necessary to take into account humanitarian and natural disasters, and unexpected technological collapses that do not have to be the direct result of the activities of an enemy state (for example, solar flares that can knock out all electronics).

What has happened in the world, why has the world come unstuck? Head of the International Centre for Defence and Security Sven Sakkov discusses it in his essay. How the Estonian defence capabilities have reacted or should react in the future to these changes is the problem we can think about together with General Ants Laaneots, who has written about the building up of the Estonian national defence, and with Colonel Enno Mõts, who is the Commandant of Estonian National Defence College, and whose article deals with the impact of technologies on the armed forces over the next ten years.

Si vis pacem, para bellum. The state has to know what resources it has and what it should do in a crisis situation. The Ministry of Justice has conducted a national defence law revision, and the leader of the Working Group Margit Gross gives an overview of it. Lawyer Emeritus Kaido Pihlakas writes about military law, which is a related topic.

Our major translated article is Mark Galeotti's analysis of the means Russia uses to direct its political war in Europe. How does Europe respond to it? Viljar Veebel describes the European Union's normative power in relations with Russia. Regarding the issues of internal security, it is also possible to read Kristjan Kaldur's article about newly arrived immigrants in Estonia, and Kristiina Raidla-Puhm's treatment of the theoretical sources of Islamic radicalism. So that what should we do better in this context than others in the world have done before us?

But as we had local elections recently, this topic should not be overlooked either. Besides security issues, there is a small block of articles on elections in the new *Riigikogu Toimetised*. Political scientist Rein Toomla examines the voter turnout, particularly in the merged local governments, and Alar Kilp discusses the election turnout of young people.

The article on the parliamentary elections of 2015 by the recipient of Riigikogu scholarship Kristiine Järvan also relates to the elections and local governments, giving a short survey of the voting loyalty of citizens. Alvar Nõuakas from the National Audit Office discusses how the state should support improving the public services of local governments.

However, in the security context, we should follow the principle that we believe in our partners and the common moral values, but we still have to do what is necessary. And if it is not possible in any way to do all, then we should do at least half.

CONVERSATION CIRCLE

Estonia is not planning to attack anyone, but to deter possible attackers

Riigikogu Toimetised panel discussion

The representatives of the factions of the Riigikogu discussed security topics in the Riigikogu Toimetised conversation circle on 15 November. Raivo Aeg (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union), Hannes Hanso (Social Democratic Party), Uno Kaskpeit (Conservative People's Party of Estonia), Ants Laaneots (Estonian Reform Party), Ain Lutsepp (Estonian Free Party) and Tiit Terik (Estonian Centre Party) participated in the discussion.

Hannes Hanso: The plans we make have to be realistic and aimed at deterrence. Estonia has never made plans to attack anybody, and will not have such plans in the future either. In politics, diplomacy, and also in the defence sector, we simply have to do everything in order that nobody made any plans to attack Estonia. That the price the aggressor had to pay would be unproportionally high and not worth the effort. One of the issues here is our own defence capability, but the other side is how we have positioned ourselves in the international context – as a NATO ally, as a member of the European Union.

Ants Laaneots: Let us look at the broad-based national defence. The idea is that all people with all the means available in the country participate in national defence. It involves several components – naturally military defence, and also civil defence, economic defence, psychological defence, etc. Broad-based national defence strategy does not establish which government institution is specifically responsible and for what. That would be necessary, and it is also necessary to integrate the existing opportunities better.

Tiit Terik: Speaking about defending ourselves, I think that there should be three components present. First, the will to defend your country, second, the relevant knowledge and skills, and naturally also the means for it, or the arms. National defence, as in the case of broad-based national defence, is not only armed resistance to the aggressor, but also every citizen knowing what is their duty in the crisis situation. Or, every person in our country should be aware what is their task in the moment of crisis situation, and this does not always have to be armed resistance.

Uno Kaskpeit: We need civil defence. All shelters from the Soviet period have been demolished, and nobody thinks what should be in their place. And this at once raises the question that if we have a crisis, what we should do. Besides that, more attention should be paid to training the teams of conscripts. At least 85–90% of our young men should do conscription service. If they all are not fit for garrison service, they do not have to run. They will be taught army life, and how to use weapons. We should return to the territorial defence system.

Ain Lutsepp: Today's world, in which we live, is undergoing great changes. In the present situation, it is not possible for countries to divide their security threats into domestic and external threats, or the responsibility of the police and the military intelligence. The threats are comprehensive. It is also necessary to take into account that when the cyber technology and all other military technologies are developing extremely rapidly, it is not the strongest that survive, but those who are able to adapt to those changes the most rapidly, and to react to them. The most important thing is how the society reacts to the changes in the security situation and is able to preserve the capability to defend its values.

Raivo Aeg: There are no more such things as conventional conflicts. All kinds of hybrid variants have emerged. We have this wisdom now. We have seen this in the example of Ukraine. However, the question today is what are the resources and activities that we have not seen yet, but the potential opponent is already planning and has not presented to us yet, so that we cannot take them into consideration. It is necessary to continue with implementing the broad-based national defence concept, and a strong coordinator is needed for that.

FOCUS

Why has the world come unstuck?

SVEN SAKKOV

Director of International Centre for Defence and Security

Director of International Centre for Defence and Security Sven Sakkov analyses the state of world affairs and its developments since the end of the Cold War.

He looks at the defining moments of the past 30 years and finds that one – 30 August 2013 – stands out as a symbolic starting point of the end of Pax Americana. That was the day when President Obama decided not to follow through on his “red line” promise about the chemical weapons use in Syria.

The apex of post-Cold War Western dominance and optimism came in 2003–2004. In April 2003, the American forces took Bagdad. In November 2004, the European leaders signed the European Constitutional Treaty. Iraq was soon engulfed by insurgency, and French voters rejected the Treaty.

The American retrenchment started with the Obama administration and continues under President Trump. Since 2008, the European Union has stumbled from crisis to crisis – the international financial crisis followed by the euro-zone debt crisis followed by the refugee crisis followed by Brexit.

Russia has meanwhile tried to undermine Europe’s security architecture in order to replace it with one where Russia is at the table and the US is not. When Russia was not included in the decision-making processes that affected its interests, it resorted to military intervention and indeed managed to regain a seat at the table. In 2008, Russia stopped Georgia’s attempts to move closer to NATO, and in 2014 it did the same in Ukraine. In 2015, Moscow got involved in Syrian civil war, and in 2016 it intervened in the US elections.

The author concludes that a small, militarily vulnerable and trade-dependent country like Estonia can survive and prosper only if the US is confident and committed to European security, and the EU is united and functions as it should. He further posits that Estonia’s foreign policy should concentrate on just two key topics – security and export. All other topics should either support those, or make room for these.

What kind of impact will emerging technologies have on the armed forces over the next 10 years?¹

ENNO MÕTS

Colonel, Commandant of Estonian National Defence College, Rector

The article proceeds from the observance that technology is developing ever more rapidly, and applied science has an unquestionable impact on the processes in society and the lives of individuals, bringing along notable changes in the perspective of a decade, not a century. The focal research question discussed is in which sectors the emerging technologies will find military application and how much it will influence warfighting over the next 10 years.

On the basis of the examples from recent history, the author summarises that the development cycle for taking into use of innovated military technologies and the exploitation period following it last more than thirty years. Analysing the characteristics of modern combat vehicles validated for serving the armies, the author concludes that their traditional capabilities have remarkably increased; however, this is not accompanied by a drastic change in tactics.

The development tendencies are automation, extensive integration of high-tech widgets to tactical level combat elements, and the increase in the range and energy efficiency of both ammunition and moving platforms, reducing the running costs of warfighting.

Combining of the robotics achievements of emerging technologies with artificial intelligence has created lethal unmanned vehicles that follow voice commands and perform their tasks (semi) autonomously. In ten year perspective, the main combat element is still a human, but as experimental tactics, animal robots interconnected to drone technology are being tested, which are able to run also in severely restricted undergrowth and take flight if necessary, creating an extremely aggressive “insect tactics”. The author is of the firm opinion that the arsenal of cyber and electronic warfare will grow significantly, which in its turn requires an increase of relevant support staff in military service.

The author finds that “boots on the ground” will continue to be of key importance for the success of warfighting, and the need for cooperation between services will extend to the subunits of the army. However, the emerging technologies will not be able to remove surprise, lack of knowledge and unforeseen impediments from warfighting – the fog of war and friction will remain the essential factors of war.

The birth of the national defence of Estonia. 1991–2017

ANTS LAANEOTS

General, Member of the Riigikogu, Reform Party

End of the Cold War and breaking up of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused real exhilaration in the West, and also in Russia. It was thought that now the age of great wars was over for ever in Europe, where two of the bloodiest world wars of humanity had taken place, and from then onwards, the countries would live in friendship and constructive mutual cooperation. And this is how it more or less happened during the last decade of the previous century. The former Soviet republics started building up independent states and transition to market economy. In Russia, this process was the most painful. The countries of the West tried to help their former enemy. Germany built houses

¹ The article is a shorter version of the argumentative essay in English by the author, with the same title, which contains references to the sources of all statements and facts reflected here. In comparison to the original text, several sub-topics and arguments have been omitted due to restrictions on length, but on the other hand, some new ideas have been added. The presented military prospect for the use of innovative technologies is the author's personal opinion, with a certain aim to intrigue and provoke the readers to think actively.

for the Russian troops that had been deployed in East Europe and now returned to homeland. The USA helped Russia to deactivate the reactors of the nuclear submarines that were written off by the Northern Fleet, and gave money for liquidating the huge stocks of chemical weapons. In NATO member states, a discussion over the future of this international defence organisation started in 1992. Several countries proposed to dissolve NATO as an organisation that was unnecessary in the new security situation. Fortunately, this was not done. It was decided to preserve the alliance, but to give it rather limited tasks – mainly peacekeeping and conducting of peace implementation operations as a part of coalition forces. Ensuring the security of member states and readiness pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty shifted to the background. The armed forces of the Western countries that had been numerous during the Cold War were being reduced abruptly, and transition to small, professional forces with limited capabilities started. They were designed not for performing the defence obligations of countries, but mainly for use in conducting peace operations as part of coalition forces. The defence budgets of NATO member states diminished rapidly. The main expenses fell on the United States. Thus, the contribution of the US formed nearly 73 percent of the total NATO defence budget in 2003.

The security situation in Europe started to deteriorate abruptly since 2000, when former KGB officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation. Already in 2003, the Kremlin announced that all post-Soviet republics belong to the “sphere of special national interests” of the Russian Federation. Russia’s extensive propaganda war and information operations started. On the orders of the Kremlin, a collection consisting of five books was composed in 2005–2010. Four books of the collection were titled “Project Russia”, Part I, II, III and IV. The most important book was “The New Russian Doctrine”, with the sub-title “Time to Stretch the Wings” («Новая русская доктрина. Пора расправить крылья» 2009). The collection came to be called Putin’s doctrine. It established two strategic goals to Russia:

- ▶ Immediate goal – to restore control over the post-Soviet countries. This was confirmed by Putin himself at the meeting of the so-called Valdai Club in September 2013.
- ▶ Final goal according to “The New Russian Doctrine” was the following. If the USA only imitates and essentially vulgarises the role of GLOBAL ADMINISTRATOR, then Russia has the right to this mission. Now it has to prove it in practice by starting to perform it.

Moscow immediately started to perform these tasks, starting from the first. The former Soviet republics were offered participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Customs Union, the Eurasian Union that was about to be formed, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Those post-Soviet countries that decided in favour of integration with the West fell victims to aggression. South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had been part of Georgia, were violently occupied in 2008. Aggression against Ukraine in 2014 ended with the annexation of Crimea and occupying the eastern part of the country, where the military activities still continue.

Russia has started a hybrid war against all countries of the West. The Kremlin has strategic interests also in the Baltic States, but thanks to the NATO and EU membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the eastern neighbour has refrained from violent activities against them. However, considering Putin’s hypocrisy and unpredictability, Estonia needs effective primary self-defence capability, which together with the allied troops located in the country would ensure effective deterrence and the real protection of our independence.

The article aims to give an overview of the difficulties and development of the establishing of the Estonian Defence Forces until the present day.

Controlling the chaos: How Russia manages its political war in Europe¹

MARK GALEOTTI

*Senior Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations Prague;
Principal Director, Mayak Intelligence Consultancy*

Russia carries out and encourages 'active measures' in Europe to destabilise and confuse governments and societies. However, these are often opportunistic and shaped by local conditions. There is no grand strategy, beyond weakening the EU and NATO and creating a more conducive environment for itself.

This involves a wide range of actors, from officials and the media, through military threats, to business lobbies and spies. Russia pursues different priorities in different countries. This is largely determined by the correlation between the strength of countries' national institutions and their vulnerability to Russian influence.

Nonetheless, there is an effort to coordinate certain operations across platforms. Insofar as there is a command-and-control node, it is within the Presidential Administration, which is perhaps the most important single organ within Russia's highly de-institutionalised state.

Without giving up hope of persuading Moscow to change its policies, Europe must nonetheless address its own vulnerabilities: 'fixing the roof' rather than simply hoping the rain will stop. Among other things, this includes addressing democratic backsliding in parts of the continent.

Does the legal framework of the Estonian national defence need updating?

MARGIT GROSS

National Defence Law Revision Working Group leader, Ministry of Justice

National defence is no longer merely military defence that includes the activity of the armed forces to combat conventional threats. National security and the ensuring of national security affect the whole society, and therefore all segments of the society, both the public, private and third sector, must contribute to the protection of the state.

In autumn 2015, the Ministry of Justice initiated a revision of national defence law. The aim of the revision was to shape a legal order that would ensure fast and effective combating of threats to public order and national security both in peace time and non-peace time. The main question is how to create a legal order that would protect the state if aggression takes place in peace-time legal space.

It has become clear from the analyses made in the course of the national defence law revision that the following shortcomings need to be resolved.

- ▶ The legal framework of the states of defence (including the increased defence readiness and the state of war) and the special states (including the emergency situation, the state of emergency and the state of war) declared for crisis situations and for resolving them needs updating and interconnecting.

Modern security threats bring about simultaneous crisis situations which complicates concrete definition of crisis situation. Differentiation between all kinds of situations (emergency, emergency situation, state of emergency, state of war) and states (peace- vs. war time) is not necessary due to the dynamics of multidimensional threats – the aim is to find a political consensus in a situation

¹ Galeotti, M. (2017). Controlling Chaos: How Russia manages its political war in Europe. European Council of Foreign Relations. ECFR. – http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/controlling_chaos_how_russia_manages_its_political_war_in_europe.

requiring a response, and to act flexibly. Finding a political consensus may be complicated in a time-critical situation where it is necessary to define the essence of a threat that is escalating or that is acquiring characteristics that create the basis for the establishment of different legal special states simultaneously.

- ▶ National defence management organisation regulations, and the mutual competences, authorities and functions of the institutions and authorities participating in national defence need harmonisation in order to ensure preparation for and resolution of both military and non-military crisis situations pursuant to the principle of uniform management.

The multitude of overlapping competences, authorities and functions provided for in current legislation make the management of crisis situations unclear and complicated at present.

- ▶ To prevent and combat novel threats, clear bases for the restriction of the fundamental rights and freedoms are needed.

The principles of democracy and human rights must be preserved in all crisis situations. The fact alone that a state of emergency or a state of war has been declared to eliminate a threat cannot automatically be a legitimate basis for activities or infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms; the implementation of any restrictive measure must be due to a specific situation.

On the basis of the analyses drawn up in the course of the revision, specific legislative amendments will be developed.

Is Estonia doing everything possible and necessary in its national defence legislative drafting to ensure its security?

KAIDO PIHLAKAS

Lawyer Emeritus, Adviser to the Estonian Reserve Officers Association, Captain in Reserve

Is Estonia doing everything possible and necessary in its national defence legislative drafting to ensure its security? Unfortunately, not sufficiently so far, considering the regulation of the activities of courts under state of emergency, especially the state of war.

One of the fields that supports security is preparing the legal system and the law enforcement agencies for acting in possible crisis situations. Estonia has not achieved the necessary readiness of courts and the law enforcement bodies connected with them, including the military police, the prosecutor's office and the bar association, especially for the state of war.

The state of regulations on administering of justice during the state of war is not something to be proud of, because there are no legislatively sufficiently clear and relevant legal safeguards for effective functioning of the legal system during the state of war, considering all its peculiarities.

The fact that after the passing of the National Defence Act, the Ministry of Justice started to plan the initial task for the legal regulation of broad-based national defence on the basis of the plan for conducting a revision of national defence law in 2016–2019, and the analysis of the Acts relating to national defence was planned, deserves recognition.

The Lawyers Section of the Estonian Reserve Officers Association has organised international conferences to analyse the experience of other countries in order to get ideas on how to organise the work of the Estonian legal system during the state of emergency and the state of war. The Lawyers Section has prepared a draft for amending the Courts Act by forming a military court for the state of war on the basis of the possibility provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia to establish special courts. The relevant practice, experience and recommendations from Estonia before the World War II, and other countries (Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Israel, USA, Ukraine) have been taken into account. The draft has been presented to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the National Defence Committee of the Riigikogu, where these issues have been discussed.

It seems that the Ministry of Justice has not yet sufficiently analysed the legislation and solutions for regulating the activities of courts during wartime of the countries that are similar to us, and of the countries with the most modern military experience. At the same time, great attention has been paid to the regulations of the state of emergency, which are based on the fight against terrorism.

There is no reason to think that it would be possible to organise the activities of courts effectively during wartime just by the specialisation of some judges in ordinary courts. The legislative and political reasoning regarding the possibilities of establishing military courts and their activities needs a substantive and very thorough analysis and argued discussion, considering the characteristic features of Estonia – the number of its population, its size, geographical position and historical experience – and also the provocative and aggressive nature of today's Russia against its neighbours, i.e. the Baltic States, and the nature of modern warfare.

POLITICS

The Nuclear Age. Introduction to the translation of Chapter 24 “The Nuclear Age” from “A Concise History of Warfare”¹ by Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

MART RAUDSAAR

In the same way as we have seen the arrival of the Internet, and how it essentially changed the existing way of communicating and even the relations between the people, the hero of World War II Marshal Montgomery saw the arrival of weapons of mass destruction, their use, and how it essentially changed the existing international security situation. This was one reason why I thought it was important to introduce the readers of *Riigikogu Toimetised* one chapter from his book *A Concise History of Warfare*. This chapter, *The Nuclear Age*, deals with the coming of nuclear age, and its fruits.

The second reason relates to the present time. It may seem unexpected to the people who have survived the Cold War, but in recent years, using of (tactical) nuclear weapons not only as deterrence, but as a real weapon on the field of war has again been spoken about. There are rumours that Russia has practised tactical nuclear strikes against the Nordic Countries and the NATO states, and Donald Trump has not excluded using nuclear weapon in the case of military solution of the Korean crisis.

This causes anxiety not only among the ordinary citizens. In November this year, the US Senate for the first time in several decades discussed the issue of how the possibilities of the President to decide over giving nuclear strikes had been organised. In the opinion of some senators, this procedure is too simple, and thus depends too much on one person, although it should be an objective and not a subjective resolution.

Therefore it is justified to cast a glance into the final years of the 1960s (or after the Caribbean Crisis), when Marshal Montgomery wrote his book *A Concise History of Warfare*. As a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Montgomery had a good command of writing and was capable of a historical excursion into the methods of warfare since the dawn of humanity. For the above-mentioned reasons, one of the last chapters of the book, titled *The Nuclear Age*, could be of interest to us. It develops from a historical survey into an essay where personal experience and reflections over the challenges of the nuclear age are dealt with, and also includes discussions over warfare in the future – it may be interesting to read all this, because for us, this future has become the past.

Not only iron and modern technology decide the outcome of a war. Let us think of Marshal Montgomery's words: “Once morale has gone, defeat is inevitable.”

¹ Montgomery, B. L. (1968). *A Concise History of Warfare*. UK: George Rainbird Ltd.

Adaptation of newly arrived immigrants in Estonia, according to the data of integration monitoring

KRISTJAN KALDUR

Analyst, Institute of Baltic Studies

This article is the first analysis that quantitatively studies the adaptation of newly arrived immigrants in Estonia. The attitudes of newly arrived immigrants in regard to several issues relating to the life and society of Estonia are analysed, using the data of a large-scale study conducted among the newly arrived immigrants in spring 2017 as source material. 2850 respondents participated in the study conducted within the framework of the Estonian integration monitoring. A majority of them were the foreigners – citizens of the European Union and third country nationals – who had arrived in Estonia in 2012–2016.

The results show that 81 percent of all respondents rate their general adaptation in Estonia as better than average or good, or very good. Nearly half of the newly arrived immigrants wished to connect themselves with Estonia for a longer time (for more than five years), which means that a large percentage of newly arrived immigrants are not just people who have come to Estonia temporarily. 32 percent of newly arrived immigrants intend to apply for the Estonian citizenship in the future; however, that wish is lower among the immigrants from the European Union and higher among third country nationals.

As could be expected, the command of the Estonian language among newly arrived immigrants is very low during their first years in Estonia, especially among those newly arrived immigrants who preferred to reply to the questionnaire in English. It shows that Estonian is learned, and the results are quite good, but even after five years, there are quite a large number of those whose language proficiency is passive or deficient. The newly arrived immigrants tend to have daily active contacts with the Estonians in working and school environment, outside of that, communication with the Estonians decreases significantly.

When we divide the target group of newly arrived immigrants conditionally into two analytical categories, the English speakers and the Russian speakers, we can see that in supporting adaptation in Estonia, it is necessary to pay attention to both, in particular separately to the target group of new Russian-speaking immigrants, who in regard to certain characteristics seem to be adapting to a different extent in comparison to the English-speaking immigrants. The Russian-speaking target group of newly arrived immigrants has less contacts with the Estonians than the English-speaking group, their level of knowledge of the Estonian language is lower in comparison to others, their sense of belonging among the Estonians does not significantly increase over time, and they also seem to perceive their situation on the labour market as somewhat more unsure than the others.

The conclusions of the article are important also in preparing the programmes and measures for supporting adaptation and long-time integration – more than half of the newly arrived immigrants are not people who have come to Estonia temporarily, but many need support in adaptation even after several years have passed.

Theoretical premises for Islamic radicalism, and the perception thereof in the responsible agencies of Estonia

KRISTIINA RAIDLA-PUHM

Branch Chief, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence

The importance of the topic is related to counter-radicalization activity, and its effectiveness proven through scientific theories and practice. This topic is relatively new in Estonia and is lacking academic research so far.

The main topic is to find out the threats caused by Islamic radicalisation, and the currently used preventive measures in Estonia. The aim is to identify the hazards associated with Islamic radicalisation, and the preventive measures that are being used to prevent radicalism.

As for the main results, in assessments of the causes of radicalisation, Estonian experts largely follow the theoretical considerations of social reasons, access to education, and relative deprivation. The failure of integration is also mentioned as one of the main reasons for radicalisation. Highly probable is the growth of Islamic radicalisation as a response to the rise of extreme right-wing phenomena in society.

- ▶ The religious ideology of radicalisation in the underlying cause is not visible. It is understood that the Islamic community in Estonia is small and peaceful. However, the author's opinion is that immigrants and religious converts are more radical in their religious beliefs and practices. The missing link between religion and Islamic radicalisation goes against both theory and international experience.
- ▶ The assessment of the threats to society related to Islamic radicalisation is described very differently as compared with other countries. The biggest threat is considered to be related to the polarisation of society and the consequent prospering of the potential hostile action of Russia. The classic terrorist attack is not particularly seen as a threat. The biggest threat is considered to emerge from refugees and new immigrants. No "old" Islamic community or religious converts are considered a major threat.
- ▶ The cooperation between different government agencies in order to prevent radicalism is good. It is commonly agreed that refugees must undergo a pre-selection procedure before being accepted here. There is a need to enhance general awareness of radicalisation in society. It is also important to review the relevant legal framework. Proper training programmes are also in high demand. A significant disadvantage is the absence of a de-radicalisation programme directed at Estonian specificities.

Based on the above, respective recommendations for related authorities were made.

European Union as normative power in Ukrainian-Russian conflict

VILJAR VEEBEL

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Senior Researcher; Baltic Defence College, Fellow

Over the last 20 years, the European Union has been associated with the export of certain universal norms, rules and practices to other countries. In academic circles, this concept is called the "normative power Europe". Democracy, rule of law, strong commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and social justice – these principles form the core of the identity of the European Union. Based on shared political, economic and cultural ties among the Member States, the EU has also sought to promote these norms in the neighbouring countries, including Russia. However, the outbreak of a violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine at the end of 2013 clearly demonstrates that the EU has failed in its pursuits in Russia despite the extensive mutual relations

and comprehensive financial support provided by the EU. As the EU has generally failed in bringing Russia over to embracing and upholding the European values, this raises the question of the authority of the EU as a normative power. Against this backdrop, the aim of the article is to analyse how consistent the EU has been in defending and promoting European values and norms in the international arena during the Ukrainian conflict. The topic is of particular importance for the EU Member States that are potentially targeted or indirectly influenced by Russia's actions.

To sum up the results of the research, the declarative communication of the institutions and the leaders of the European Union during the Ukrainian conflict from November 2013 to June 2017 appears to be at least non-consistent if not downright controversial. Inconsistencies in protecting the European norms and values have occurred on two levels. First, within the statements of the EU institutions, e.g. the members of the European Commission, while pledging "unwavering support" to Ukraine's territorial integrity, have simultaneously called for cooperation with Russia in other issues. Basically, since mid-2015, references to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and Russia's role in it disappear from the declarative communications of the European Council, the European Commission, and the High Representative, despite the fact that the territorial integrity of Ukraine has not been restored and the conditions of the Minsk I and II agreements have not been fulfilled. Furthermore, at a later stage of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the declarative communications of the EU institutions seem to focus on linking the progress achieved by Ukraine to the European norms and values.

Referring to the above outlined theoretical remarks on the collective identity of the EU and on the unity and consistency of public statements and messages of the institutions and leaders of the EU as a very important part of this collective image, it would definitely help to improve the image of the EU as a normative power if the EU would formulate the core values and norms that it is ready to unwaveringly protect in critical situations, as well as to what is the expected outcome of the conflict. In this regard, an introduction of double standards should particularly be avoided.

Electoral availability in the Estonian parliamentary elections, 2015¹

KRISTINE JÄRVAN

Government Office of Estonia, Adviser for EU Presidency

Estonian electoral system seems to be very stable when looking at the volatility of parliamentary elections. However, the individual voting behaviour indicates a different situation. The process behind the discrete vote in the parliamentary elections is far more complicated because voters differ in the level of political availability. Some voters are strong supporters of one specific political party and other parties probably do not have a chance to change their preferences. Other voters are more flexible in that matter and they are open to giving their vote to different parties at different elections. The latter is the main focus group for electoral competition because there is indeed a higher probability that they would change their voting preference.

This study empirically evaluated the available electorate in Estonia by using quantitative approach and the survey conducted after Estonian parliamentary elections in 2015. The available electorate is defined as a group of voters who with a high probability would make a choice between more than two parties when voting. The opposite group of voters are loyal voters who would give their vote only to one specific party. In addition to available and loyal voters, there is also a third group consisting of voters who with a high probability would not give their vote to any party. The analysis shows that almost one quarter of the Estonian electorate is available to electoral competition, half of the voters are loyal voters and the rest of the voters do not have clear electoral preferences.

¹ Peer-reviewed article.

After defining these groups, the analysis continues with the empirical evaluation of the socio-demographic characteristics, political attitudes and electoral preferences of these groups. The analysis shows that compared to loyal voters, the available voters in Estonia are more likely Estonian, well-educated, young and with a higher salary. Political attitudes differ more between the electorates of different parties, and are not affected by the political availability of the voters. The analysis of electoral preferences shows that the Estonian Centre Party has the most stable electorate, and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union has the most unstable electorate. When looking at the attitudes of each party's electorate towards other parties, we can observe an interesting pattern. It implies a strong gap between the voters of the Centre Party and the voters of any other party: those who vote for the Centre Party are unlikely to vote for any other party, while on the other hand, those who do not vote for the Centre Party, most probably have a very negative attitude towards this party.

The study proposes that political parties as a whole should concentrate first on their loyal voters because of their significant proportion in the electorate (especially the Centre Party where roughly 75% of the voters are loyal). Additionally, they should also focus on the available electorate because these voters are more likely to change their vote (especially the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union where 43% of voters are politically available).

Voter turnout, particularly in merged local governments

REIN TOOMLA

Teacher, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu

The administrative-territorial reform of 2017 was the most thorough one ever in the history of the Republic of Estonia. The number of local municipalities decreased by nearly three times – from 213 to 79. As a result of that, 50 new local municipalities were formed which consisted of at least two, and in the most extreme case, seven, old local municipalities. Elections in the neighbouring countries of Estonia – specifically in Finland and Latvia – have shown that voter turnout tends to fall in merged local municipalities. In the debates before the elections, that was thought to happen in Estonia, too – the reason being the potential disappointment of the electorate when the state clearly prefers quantitative indicators when organising the administrative-territorial reform. In the Government's opinion, a rural municipality or city with at least 5000 residents is a viable local municipality.

The results of the local government council elections in Estonia in 2017 can be interpreted in various ways. First of all, it had to be admitted that the voter turnout in Estonia as a whole fell – 58 per cent in 2013 and 53.3 per cent in 2017. If the restructuring of local governments had involved all local municipalities, the administrative-territorial reform could indeed have been pointed out as the primary reason for voter turnout – as was actually the case in Latvia. A somewhat more complicated situation emerged in Estonia. In those 50 new merged local municipalities, the voter turnout was somewhat higher than in the country as a whole – 53.8 per cent. In the local municipalities that remained unchanged, which numbered 29, the turnout accounted for 52.9 per cent. Thus, a conclusion can be made here that the fall of voter turnout was the greatest in the local municipalities whom the administrative-territorial reform did not concern. The fall was particularly steep in larger cities, for example in the capital, Tallinn, the turnout decreased from 64.1 per cent to 53.5 per cent.

Yet the 50 local municipalities mentioned do not constitute a single whole. Comparing the voter turnout in 2013 and in 2017, it appeared that the turnout had risen in 14 local municipalities and fallen in 36 local municipalities. In terms of both the number of local municipalities and the number of the people living there – around 75 per cent of the inhabitants of those 50 local municipalities

resided in 36 local municipalities – we can still speak of a decline. However, the rise in the 14 local municipalities was so high that it compensated the low fall in the remaining ones.

The local municipalities that had recourse to a court to repeal the administrative-territorial reform did not form a whole either. The Supreme Court rejected all their applications but that did not bring about a fall in voter turnout in those local municipalities – in about a third of the 17 local municipalities that had had recourse to a court and had lost there, voter turnout grew.

Young people running as candidates in (local) elections

ALAR KILP

Lecturer in comparative politics, University of Tartu

Young people running as candidates in (local) elections should be recognized and acknowledged as: an important type of political participation; a transition from a (largely) passive voter and bystander into an active participant in politics; an activity that is good in itself irrespective of its consequences and successes. Young candidates in elections are as important as young voters.

This article studies the topic from four fundamental aspects:

1. How does the transition from the political behavior of ordinary citizens into a person who “does politics” in an active way (as a candidate who runs for electoral office) take place in real life? What are the experiences of an individual who goes through this transition?
2. What ethical and normative dilemmas are being confronted by the persons who have learned the ethics of a good citizen in the classroom, but will face the challenges of conflict and competition both within and between political parties during the electoral campaign?
3. Politics are competitive and conflictual to the degree that is impossible to reproduce or simulate in educational contexts. In this regard, it is inevitable that the persons who “go into politics” will learn some social and organizational competences “from scratch”, and have to readjust the learned disposition of honesty, solidarity, responsibility and common good to political realities of electoral campaigns.
4. Lastly, running as a candidate to representative institutions is an important practical outlet for undergraduate students of government and political studies, which allows them to learn how to apply the knowledge about their discipline in real organisational, social and political situations.

The study is based on the answers to a 15-point questionnaire, completed by nine students and one graduate of the program of Government and Politics at the University of Tartu. They all ran as candidates in local elections in October 2017. Among them, the youngest were 19 years old and the oldest 26 years old.

The study demonstrates that the majority were internally motivated to run at local elections. However, for several students, the final decision depended on an invitation or an encouragement either from a political party or from a relative. Two of them “made it” to a local council, but all were positive about the experience. They learned several lessons, including the insight that while it makes sense for young people to represent the interests of the young, it would be better still to address all the other groups of voters as well, and to be competent in issues beyond the ones that concern the young. Eight out of ten had the opportunity to contribute to the electoral program of their party or electoral union in their voting district, three of them even assumed a leadership position during this process. They all saw first-hand how political campaigns are conducted. They all experienced competition and ethical dilemmas. All of them identified principles and tactics to be used in case they would ever run as candidates again. They can now plausibly claim to know what it feels like to be a politician and how it feels like to be in politics.

How to achieve uniform quality of local public services – A view of municipal real estate

ALVAR NÕUAKAS

Auditor at National Audit Office

As a result of the administrative reform, in 2018, the number of local municipalities will decrease and bigger municipalities will presumably be better prepared to perform their functions. However, the municipalities will still need help with real estate maintenance in the future. The local municipalities own too many buildings and the floor plans of the buildings are inadequate. Over a half of these buildings are in a bad condition due to age and poor maintenance. In the new situation, the leaders of local municipalities have to decide which property is really needed by the locals and how to provide services as optimally as possible, so that the maintenance of superfluous and costly real estate wouldn't become an objective in and of itself.

The aim of governmental and foreign subsidies is to reduce the developmental lag of local municipalities. However, according to the National Audit Office, during the last 10 years, the municipalities have not received enough subsidies, considering their financial capacity and their big, problematic real estate portfolios. Moreover, the subsidies have been assigned in a fragmented manner, i.e. as small sums for specific objects. Therefore, over a third of the buildings that have received subsidies are still in bad condition. Up until now only 20% of the subsidies has come from the state budget, while 80% has come from foreign sources. During the financial period 2020+, the EU aid to Estonia will probably decrease, and if the financing model of municipalities is not changed, their capacity for real estate maintenance will decrease even further. This can lead to reduced availability of services along with the fall in quality. Already now the municipalities consider it necessary to invest EUR 800 million to renovate the existing real estate. This figure exceeds the total amount of subsidies assigned during the last decade by more than 2.4 times.

The National Audit Office has recommended that government should cooperate with local municipalities to find out the real estate needs of justified local services, agree on the general objectives and conditions of subsidies and then allow the local municipalities to decide for themselves how to optimize their use of real estate via subsidies. With good planning it is possible to ensure adequate services with uniform quality in local municipalities.

Gender gaps in Education

AUNE VALK

Ministry of Education and Research, Head of Analysis Department

The present article analyses gender gaps in education in Estonia based on research papers and proposes several ways for dealing with it.

Gender gaps are not just a problem of the education system. Compared to several other areas, in the education sector, there is more equality in Estonia than in the EU on the average. At the same time, education plays a very important role in promoting gender equality. School is affected by values of the society, but the school can also change them or reproduce them.

Gender difference in education is evident in several aspects in Estonia. The length of studies and the results of studies are generally in favour of girls. At the same time, boys are more confident in their knowledge, e.g. in their knowledge of Maths. The difference in education choices between girls and boys is already evident at the end of basic school. Twice as many boys start vocational education. Gender distribution is very uneven among the different study programs in vocational secondary education. About 60% of university students are women. There are, however, two times more female

graduates than male. When looking at higher education in Estonia, gender gap tends to shift in favour of women in the fields of education, health, and welfare. However, this is also the case on the international level. Out of the European countries Estonia displays the largest gender gap among adults with higher education. Estonia has one of the greatest differences in Europe in the percentage of women and men with higher education. There is also the largest gender pay gap, to the detriment of women.

Although gender gaps are a rather major issue in Estonia, few view it as a problem, also in education. Only one in three teachers treats gender equality as a value. Few have participated in relevant trainings, and 2/3 of the teachers believe that the society's expectations towards men and women cannot be changed.

Gender (gap) is influenced by different socialisation of children, school culture, and extracurricular activities. School culture and the social-economic status of one's peers influences boys more than girls. Vocational choices are influenced by parents' attitudes, but also by the general perception of gender equality by the society. Parents usually expect the boys to start a career in a field connected to natural sciences, exact sciences, and technology. The differences in expectations are not explained by the different results of boys and girls. It has been established that women study longer as they benefit from studies more thanks to the increased participation in the labour market. At school boys often believe that education is of little use to them. After graduating however they read more and develop their skills in a way that allows them to quickly catch up with the girls who had surpassed them at school.

According to this analysis, the solution to the problem is such school culture where learning has been made more interesting and connected with the real life. Development of clear guidelines emphasising the value of gender equality should also be considered. There is a need to develop teachers' skills, attitudes, and beliefs that would support gender equality. Perhaps it would be of help if relevant indicators were published according to genders, pointing out the importance of the topic. An equal development of skills of men and women at a later point can be supported through changes in parental benefit policy and training policy.

VARIA

Impact of universities on the development of society and economy in the context of a small country¹

KADRI UKRAINSKI

Professor in Research and Innovation Policy, University of Tartu

HANNA KANEP

Executive Secretary, Universities Estonia

KADI TIMPMANN

Assistant of Public Sector Economics, University of Tartu

DIANA EERMA

Associate Professor in Economic Policy, University of Tartu

The broader purpose of the article is to analyse various methodological approaches on how to assess the comprehensive impact of universities on economy quantitatively or semi-quantitatively. Earlier studies conducted all over the world, implemented practices and recommendations of international organisations are used as a basis.

¹ This article was written as a result of the project "The Impact of Universities on the Development of Economy: Setting the Initial Task and Development of Methodology", financed from the development fund of the University of Tartu.

The article explains how universities influence the society from the point of view of a small country. The impact of universities on the development of economy and society is expressed both in the direct and indirect impact of the research and education provided by the universities, and in the specific results and impact regarding the individuals, the community and the society as a whole. The universities make a direct contribution to economic, social, human and environmental capital.

The assessments of the extent of the impact have been used for different purposes – for performing the reporting obligation, and also for analysing and dividing of resources, and for changing of behaviour and attitude. There are different methods for assessing the impact, but often the “input→activity→output→(distribution)” type of analyses prevail in the impact analyses of the universities, and in the case of the state and the funders, “implementation→result→impact” type of analyses dominate.

The main channels of impact differ greatly by fields of research. All fields of research contribute to increasing the capabilities of people through education in the same way, but the contribution of natural and technical sciences is more important to the development of economy and services, and the contribution of medicine to health and welfare. Agricultural sciences contribute more to the shaping of environment, social sciences to the shaping of policies and the implementation of regulations, and the humanities to the society and to international activities. The above-mentioned channels seem to be self-evident, but in assessing the specific impact in these channels, the authors recommend to define and set out the impact of instruction and training activities more than it has been done so far, and also to use the assessment of universities as economic units more in order to comprehend the direct contribution of universities as economic actors to knowledge-based economy,

including the export. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to draw the attention of policy-shapers and the society to the diversity of impact channels, with the aim of using the universities better than it has been done so far as instruments of economic and societal development.

Top-level research in Estonia and its problems

LEHO TEDERSOO

Senior Research Fellow, University of Tartu Natural History Museum, Member of the Estonian Young Academy of Sciences

LILI MILANI

Senior Research Fellow, Estonian Genome Center at the University of Tartu, Member of the Estonian Young Academy of Sciences

HEISI KURIG

Research Fellow, University of Tartu Institute of Chemistry, Vice-President of the Estonian Young Academy of Sciences

Top-level research is necessary for a small country like Estonia in order to ensure cooperation with research institutions abroad, export innovative products and promote the society here. The need for innovative approach can be felt from the medicine system to the environment and energy sectors. The innovative analysing methods created by scientists are increasingly used in the humanities for analysing and preserving the development of language and culture. The low financing of top-level research by the state puts the sustainability of research in Estonia under doubt, because the financing by the EU is decreasing and the Estonian companies do not participate in the financing of research on the level expected by the government. This has brought along the situation where only one of eight research funding applications to the Estonian Research Council receives financing, and several very strong projects of the most cited researchers are rejected due to lack of money. Several specialities do not get any support from the state and survive only thanks to the financial aid from the university. Doctoral studies in the Estonian universities are in the most critical state,

because doctoral scholarship is significantly lower than the average salary. Young researchers who have acquired doctor's degree and completed post-doctoral studies abroad experience difficulties in finding suitable work, and the universities do not have adequate career models for promoting their scientific career and ensuring initial funding. We suggest four main ways for the most effective promoting of research in Estonia: increasing the contribution of the state rapidly to at least 1 percent of GDP; increasing the doctoral scholarships to at least the average net salary in Estonia; creation of career models for young researchers at the universities and assistance for entering business; and reducing of bureaucracy in checking the use of research funding.