

# Summaries

EDITOR IN CHIEF'S COLUMN

## To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question

MART RAUDSAAR

*Editor-in-Chief of Riigikogu Toimetised*

Putin has always congratulated the Republic of Estonia on its anniversary, and he probably did so this time, too, but in general he managed to spoil the anniversary of our country, of course. As will be remembered, Russia launched a full-scale attack on Ukraine from various directions early in the morning of 24 February.

We have experienced everything that is going on in Ukraine in our history. As retired officer and member of the Riigikogu Leo Kunnas says in the discussion panel of Riigikogu Toimetised, Ukraine has made two mistakes. Their war-time defence forces were too small, and they remained too modest with their deterrence. These are mistakes that Estonia must learn from. Fortunately, there is total unanimity regarding security policy among our political parties and Estonia has decided to increase its defence spending rapidly. You can read about it in more detail already in the panel discussion of this issue, where Jaak Juske, Enn Eesmaa and Mihhail Lotman participated besides Leo Kunnas. Marko Mihkelson has written an additional piece on the part of the Reform Party. In recent months, he has been engaged in creditable shuttle diplomacy with our allies in his capacity as

Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu.

Colonel Peeter Tali has written an essay about how Russia has defined war and peace, and how Russia has been taking the West by surprise with its information operations. Analyst Andres Mäe writes about the energy security and energy vulnerability of small countries, taking the case of the Baltic States. It is a very thought-provoking piece of writing.

Professor of International Business at the University of Tartu Urmas Varblane and doctoral student at the same university Mathias Juust study more closely how the events in Ukraine may be a prelude to a bigger stand-off in the world, in particular between the US and China.

Director General of the Rescue Board Kuno Tammearu looks at Estonia's crisis preparedness in terms of stocks and shelter options. On a linked topic, the Master's thesis of MA Piret Avarmaa makes a good reading, giving an overview of the technological development of weapons systems and the ways of protecting oneself from them.

Specialists of the National Library of Estonia Laura Annast, Kateryna Botnar and Kristiina Kaju provide a survey of the books and websites that are educating in helping us cope better with the information war. It can be said to be a fairly useful little self-help corner.

In the "Political thought" section, Tunne Kelam, Member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2019, continues

his observations series, which also includes a little memoir moment. In this issue, he writes about the relations with Russia and the attempts to overcome the Communist legacy. In an unfortunate turn of events, it appears to be a very topical piece of writing once again, although none of us could foresee that it would turn out as it has when we were planning the series.

In the research section, we publish three studies in cooperation with the Estonian Research Council about their RITA programme. It was a programme in the course of which ministries commissioned studies with a view to shaping a knowledge-based policy. On a linked topic, President of the Estonian Academy of Sciences Tarmo Soomere writes about science for policy.

We publish two other studies by the Foresight Centre and look at the developments in the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences. There is a separate extensive study on what a youth-centred approach to young people might look like.

CONVERSATION CIRCLE

## The Security Situation has Undergone a Drastic Change And We Must be Prepared for All Eventualities

RIIGIKOGU TOIMETISED PANEL DISCUSSION

The war in Ukraine and Estonia's security are hot topics right now, which is why representatives of political groups in the Riigikogu explored the same in the discussion panel of *Riigikogu Toimetised* on May 4. The panel was Enn Eesmaa (Centre Party), Jaak Juske (Social Democratic Party), Leo Kunnas (Estonian Conservative People's Party), and Mihhail Lotman (Isamaa).

**ENN EESMAA:** It may sound like a platitude that we are living in a new world

after February 24, but it is nevertheless true. I predict that it will take at least two to three generations for the world and the European nations to bring themselves to fully restoring their relations with Russia. And this incredible rating that Putin enjoys is partly because many Russians, including members of the Russian speaking community in Estonia, see all the criticism as not directed against Putin's regime but directly against the Russian nation, and this is extremely unfortunate.

A war in our neighbourhood has made a lot of things clearer both for NATO and Estonia. Today we have battalion-size battlegroups and an air policing mission in the Baltic states. It is clear that this presence is not enough in the current situation. We would need a division-size presence in every Baltic state, which would include both Estonian and allied units.

**MIHHAIL LOTMAN:** I believe that Russia is currently a criminal state, as defined by phenomenologist Karl Jaspers. A criminal state is one that cannot refrain from committing crimes because it is criminal by nature and expresses its nature by crimes and not good deeds.

The Riigikogu adopted a statement calling the war in Ukraine a genocide war. What's happening there is well and truly a genocide. Because there is a continuous and unbreakable chain that links Putin to this wife of a soldier who incites her husband to rape Ukrainian women. Laughing! This chain runs through all the stages: propaganda, different authorities, ending up with the military and their wives, mothers, girlfriends who say – bring us stuff, rob the locals. Yes, it is a criminal society.

Putin dreams of the Baltic Sea being a closed sea [under Russia's control]. Russia's military exercises focused on closing the Danish straits, and one landing would probably have been planned to the Island of Gotland and the other one most likely somewhere in Estonia. But now as Sweden and Finland are joining NATO, the

situation in this field is changing dramatically. I think that the weakest points of Estonia's national defence are air-defence and coastal defence, and this is where we must definitely make more efforts.

**JAAK JUSKE:** I am sure that over the last twenty years we have been witnessing the rebirth of the totalitarian Russian empire, step-by-step. Europe has by and large made the same mistake as in the 1930s. Hitler could have been much more easily stopped in 1935, or even 1938, but eventually it took a really big war. The last of Putin's fans had their eyes opened on 24 February. A fundamental change is the very likely accession of the Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden, to NATO, which helps Estonia preserve its democracy. As long as the totalitarian criminal regime perseveres in Russia, I like the suggestion of one of our security experts that we should become a Little Israel. Israel is a democratic state which is surrounded by enemies; a country that is armed to the hilt and yet holds on to democracy. This is sadly the product of their geopolitical location.

When it comes to military defence, Estonia has never been as well protected in history as it is today. The Estonian nation must absolutely be more broadly prepared in the current precarious situation. But we can sleep in peace because Estonia is well protected with the help of our allies.

**LEO KUNNAS:** Who is Putin? First of all, he is a Chekist; second, he is a *blatnoi*. A *blatnoi* whose gang is the whole Russia. I have come into contact with both categories in my youth. Their understanding of morality and decency is the total opposite of the normal people. Concerning Russia's massive attack against Ukraine, I would put it very simply that they have bitten off more than they can chew in Ukraine. Ukraine cannot be conquered by military means. But we must not euphorically assume that the Ukrainians have repulsed Russia and that Russia is so weak that

there is nothing left for us to do. Ukraine made the mistake of keeping their war time defence forces too small to deter Russia. After Ilovaisk and Debaltseve in 2014–2015, Ukraine's war time defence forces should have been 700,000 strong. Estonia must not repeat these mistakes. Our defence forces have been too small, and our defence expenditure is too low, we have left huge gaps in our capabilities. Now we are trying to complete in three or four years what we should have done over the previous ten to fifteen years.

We have three enhancement packages coming for the next four years. In reality, new capabilities will probably be reflected in the budget strategy for 2023–2026. The first package is EUR 380 million, 340 million of which is earmarked for military national defence and 40 million for comprehensive national defence, mainly targeted at the Ministry of the Interior but also others. This goes to purchasing ammunition, which has twelve different categories, starting with ammunition for handguns and ranging all the way to missiles and sea mines.

FOCUS

## Ukrainians Have Not Yet Won the Information War, But the Russian General Staff Has Already Lost It

PEETER TALI

*Strategic Communications Specialist, Colonel*

The ideology of Putin's Russia relies for a large part on the old Tsarist stock that can be summed up in three words – Tsar, Orthodoxy and nationalism/native land. Russia is a special country, and it is home to a special people that is different to Europe, and only Russia has the right regime.

The new ideology of Putin's Russia was formulated in the book series "Project Russia", compiled by a working group comprised of researchers and representatives of special services and the Orthodox Church on the order of the Russian President and published in 2005–2009. In Russia and elsewhere, it has come to be called the doctrine of Putin's Russia. It sets out two strategic goals for Russia. The most immediate of these goals is not to restore the Soviet Union but the Russian Empire that included Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.

The strategic end-goal is literally the following, "While the United States is merely imitating and actually tarnishing the role of a global administrator, Russia should have a natural right for this mission. Now Russia has to confirm this role by actually implementing it."

Putin's regime reached this ambitious goal through painful losses in Chechnya, through humiliation and searching for identity. During the first Chechen War (1994–1996), Chechens managed to create an image of themselves as a small, freedom-loving people with ancient traditions who are pitted against an empire of evil. The war ended in an armistice and Russia withdrew its troops from the Chechen grounds. In the second Chechen war, the Kremlin had taken initiative in the information battlespace, and it ended with a power shift in Grozny in less than a year.

The Arab Spring that began in 2011 and the "colour revolutions" that took place in the background caused great concern to the Kremlin's power vertical. For Putin and his closest associates, a potential power shift in the Kremlin is literally a matter of life and death.

In February 2013, the newspaper *Voenna-Promyshlenny Kurier* published a report by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov that came to be called 'the Gerasimov doctrine'. It is the understanding of the Russian General Staff

of modern warfare. In the 21st century, the distinct boundaries between war and peace are dissolving. Wars are not declared anymore. The rules of war have changed. In the whole conflict, military measures make up just one-fourth of the toolbox, next to the diplomatic and political, economic, and information and influencing measures.

The model of thought that had been developed was skilfully implemented by the Kremlin in the occupation and annexation of Crimea and later in the new type of warfare in Donbass. This was yet another strategic surprise for the West because the idea of warfare had been changed. The implementation of the new, aggressive strategy of the Russian Federation represented a direct threat to NATO, as the new approach avoided the triggers that were necessary for application of NATO's Article 5.

On 25 December 2014, Putin signed the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which sums up the lessons of three military campaigns. In this doctrine, Russia, the only country in the world to do so, challenges NATO and the US. At strategic level, Putin's Russia is aiming to create divisions between international organisations and allied countries, such as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO. At operational level, the aim is to sow distrust between the leaders of countries, the state apparatus and common people. It does not matter who to set in opposition or how.

It seemed that the Russian General Staff had learned from experience and was boosting the development of warfare in the information space. After the invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Kremlin was hit by an information shock. Nothing turned out as the Kremlin had imagined. Ukraine grabbed the initiative in the information space from the first hours of the war. Ukraine basically did what Chechens had done in the first Chechen war. Ukraine told the Old Testament story of David and Goliath.

Ukraine showed the heroism of its soldiers and the support and resolve of the

Ukrainian people. It documented Russians' war crimes and showed the poor command and poor supply of Russian troops, and ridiculed Russian weapons systems that were claimed to be unparalleled in the world by Russian information warriors.

Ukraine is working in three main directions. First, it is giving instructions to its residents, making efforts to keep up morale, and showing that it is possible to destroy the much-touted Russian troops. Second, it is deterring Putin's Russia and the allies of the occupants from coming to wage war in Ukraine. Third, it is showing the destructions and documented war crimes by Russians to the free Western world.

Ukrainians are in great luck to have President Volodymyr Zelenskyy who has a history as a stand-up comedian. In a matter of days, if not hours, Zelenskyy became a war-time leader and the whole Ukrainian people gathered around him.

Zelenskyy as a one-time entertainer can perceive very well the expectations of the audience and the mood in the air. He knows his audience and target groups and finds opportunities to turn unexpected situations into victories. He masterfully manages the opportunities of social media and smartphone and is able to get messages across simply and understandably.

Media analysts have underlined Ukraine's methodical approach and consistency.

Russia's massive disinformation campaign and effort in the cognitive battlespace has clearly not been successful in the Western information space. Ukraine has consolidated the narrative of Ukraine's bravery and indomitability. In the information space of the free world, Ukraine's narrative and Ukraine's messages are dominant.

## Energy Security and Energy Vulnerability of Small Countries: Case of the Baltic States

ANDRES MÄE

*Energy Policy Analyst*

In mutually dependent energy relations, countries are facing difficult choices if one of the parties of the relationship feels impunity and the market is having trouble with regulating dramatic price fluctuations or supply shortages.

Evaluation of the threats and risks of energy sector should give direct information to national policy makers. The definition of energy security that includes these threats and risks raises obstacles because, due to the ambiguity of the term, very many risks have to be taken into account, and most of them are already managed in the daily functioning of energy sector.

The impossibility of measuring energy security does not contribute to the discussion on formulating better policy. The energy policy debate is restricted to mere political rhetoric or at best to drawing attention to the problem, but will not provide solutions.

For the sake of clarity and effectiveness, we will replace energy security with energy vulnerability and use financial-economic instruments to measure the latter. In other words, we calculate the economic damage caused by power outages resulting from external adverse events and compare it with the costs of alternative solutions.

The Baltic States depend partly on imports of electrical energy and almost entirely on imports of fossil fuels. The energy vulnerability of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania does not include oil and its products, where we are in the same situation as other countries in the region. Thanks to grid connections, energy vulnerability is relatively small also in electrical energy. The energy vulnerability of the Baltic

States is caused by their continued high dependence on the natural gas imported from Russia and its large share in the production of heat and also electrical energy.

## The Fight Between the US and China for Leading Role in Global Economy

URMAS VARBLANE

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MATHIAS JUUST

*Doctoral Student, University of Tartu*

The economic power struggle between the USA and China has been going on for years, but the COVID-19 pandemic and the new Russian aggression have made international strategic economic dependencies an even more acute problem. China's new economic and geopolitical rise has been underpinned by globalisation of economy and a national export-led growth model. In the developed countries, the unequal distribution of globalisation revenues and the stagnation of working-class incomes have led to populism, which has weakened democratic economic systems on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, we have reached a situation where the West is both economically dependent on and in a conflict of values with certain countries. The confrontation between China and the USA simultaneously reflects the struggle for the leading role in global economy and an ideological conflict of values.

Since the end of Cold War, China's regional geopolitical ambitions have become global, with the final aim of overthrowing the USA from the position of hegemony. In economic sphere, China's new ambitions are illustrated by the international Silk Road project and the strategy that focuses on

achieving competition advantages for strategic industries. More serious response from the USA came during the reign of President Trump, when the process of bilateral decoupling and trade war began. The struggle over the development of strategic technologies has led to technological nationalism, according to which government intervention in markets is justified as a defence against hostile foreign state and private actors.

As a manifestation of technological nationalism, the USA has suspended the investments of its companies in China in a number of strategically important areas, such as the development and manufacturing of chips, and has blocked knowledge transfer to China. During the reign of President Biden, the approach relating to China has remained more or less the same, although more attention is paid to strategic allied relationships. At the heart of China's response is the policy of Dual Circulation aimed at supporting the development of the internal market, eliminating dependence on Western technological inputs and achieving economic independence.

Geopolitical tensions and problems with the supply security of long value chains have made both countries and multinational companies look for alternatives. When deciding the location of their production units, companies have to strike a balance between the cost, risk and performance levels in the destinations of their activities. In the event of a significant increase in the level of risk in one country, it therefore becomes realistic to move production to countries with increasingly higher costs. Based on the desire of the Western countries and companies to increase the performance of their value chains, Estonia may have an opportunity to establish itself in new strategic sectors. This would support both national development of economy, and security. For example, rare-earth metals, the vast majority of which currently come from China, are necessary for many technological devices. However, in this area of huge demand, Estonia is the

second largest import partner of the USA at 6%, which illustrates Estonia's potential to be selected as a vital part of the strategic value chains of the West.

## The Rescue Board Before the War and During the War

**KUNO TAMMEARU**

*Director General of the Rescue Board*

Estonia has chosen the right path in developing comprehensive national defence, and the rescue network as an essential part of it must be ready for any crisis, including war. The war in Ukraine set in motion the processes and called into focus the activities that have been a priority for the Rescue Board for a long time. Concept of civilian protection that defined and explained the nature and needs of the protection of civilian population was drafted already in 2018. Necessary activities are also set out in both the previous and the current National Defence Development Plans but have not been funded until now.

The basis for the protection of civilian population is a rescue network that works in all situations, the ability of people to cope with crises, and the capability of local governments and other authorities to perform their tasks and help people in crises. We have been promoting crisis management and cooperation with local governments for many years and the system is strong.

Ukraine's experience shows that in war, the rescuer is on the battlefield with the soldier, although their activities are different. The Rescue Board as an authority for the protection of civilians has set as its priorities, among other things, raising awareness among the population about preparedness and behaviour in the event of war, preparing of evacuation sites, mapping and marking

public shelters, and ensuring continuity and supplies for rescue operations. Co-operation between the rescue services and the Defence Forces is also of key importance, as soldiers must be able to fight while the people of Estonia are protected.

In addition to the lessons from Ukraine, we can also learn from our northern neighbours. Finland has been systemically preparing already from World War II. The availability of food and medical supplies, the condition of shelters and evacuation sites to protect people, and much more has been considered. Lithuania gives detailed crisis information to its people. At the same time, studies both in Estonia and in Lithuania have shown that preparedness depends on several aspects.

The Rescue Board has formulated four components that ensure comprehensive preparedness for various crises:

- ▶ people must have supplies for 7 days and make arrangements with their close ones;
- ▶ communities (apartment associations and neighbourhoods) must be prepared and ready to help those who are weaker;
- ▶ local governments must be aware of risks and have risk communication, plans, training and crisis structures;
- ▶ state is responsible for crisis management, cooperation and ensuring of continuity.

The Rescue Board supports local governments with risk assessments and contributes to the preparedness of an integrated rescue network – both before a crisis and during a crisis. Strong regional network is of key importance.

For the civilian protection to function, it is necessary to keep the basic infrastructure for conducting rescue activities in order and make plans for coping during crises. Allocations of funds for developing comprehensive national defence are significant and essential. Preparation for war and creation of the systems helps resolve also other threats. Comprehensive national

defence means that the whole country (incl. the politicians) has a common understanding of activities and their financing. At the Rescue Board, we like to say that we are successful when everyone does their part ... and a little bit more.

## How to Deal with the Strategy of a “Mad Man”? Lessons from the Ukrainian War in 2022

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With rational thinking, it is almost impossible to find a logical motivation for Russia's military aggression in Ukraine with its political and economic losses. However, a certain explanation can be found in the “madman model” known from the game theory, which is mainly used by those participants to whom the so-called balance theory and other rational choice models do not offer success or a chance of winning. One of the best-known earlier users of the madman model was the former President of the USA Richard Nixon, who intentionally pretended unpredictable behaviour in the 1960s in order to intimidate and confuse his opponents.

Why does this article prefer to analyse namely that model? The continuity and regularity with which Russia has shaped and spread its aggressive narratives both domestically and internationally during the last 15–20 years contradict the view that attacking Ukraine was the result of Vladimir Putin's mental confusion or mental health problems of recent years. Russia has been preparing for confrontation with Ukraine and the Western

countries for decades, highlighting the historical ambitions and fears of the Russian people and spreading the opinion that Russia as a state has special position and rights in the world. As a result of that, the most radical scenarios that were earlier only hypothetically discussed in the West became true in February 2022. Now the leaders of the Western countries have to find an answer to the question of which strategy should be used to stop Putin's aggressive ambitions. The choice can be made between three essentially different and mutually exclusive assessments of the situation and the strategy to follow.

The first strategic option is to rely on rational choice and the so-called balance theory that focuses on comparing profits and losses, risks and wins on the basis of rational calculation. NATO's deterrence model uses this logic as its foundation and basis. Based on this logic of this strategy, it is assumed that in order to influence Russia, it is necessary on the one hand to contribute to credible deterrence through enhancing the capability of NATO's military contingent in the neighbourhood of Russia and, on the other hand, to increase pressure in the form of sanctions to force Russia's political elite to give up its plans. The current strategy of the West proceeds from this logic.

As the second option, it is necessary to have, at least on a theoretical level, a strategy that assumes that Vladimir Putin really has mental health issues, due of which he is not able to assess reality objectively. In such a case, there is no reason to expect rational decisions from Russia (or in other words, deterrence and sanctions do not work) and the possible approach in communicating with Putin is to use the methods that are like the ones the psychologists and psychiatrist use in the case of patients with similar diagnosis.

The precondition for the third strategic option is that Vladimir Putin, who is of sound mind and rational, intentionally behaves like a madman in front of the public, in order to marginalise the existing

deterrence models of the Western countries and to intimidate them, for example, by saying that if they intervene in the war in Ukraine, Russia could launch a nuclear war. In this case, looking for solutions should be based on the inner logic of the so-called madman model of game theory.

The aim of the article is to discuss which advantages and disadvantages the third option, or the madman strategy, contains for Russia and how the West can respond adequately to it. The article tries to find answers to such questions as: what motivated Vladimir Putin to start the war in Ukraine; what went wrong for Russia in using the madman strategy; what steps can be expected from Vladimir Putin in the future on the basis of game theory, and how should the West respond to Russia's behaviour.

## The Options of Sheltering for the Civilian Population from the Dangers Occurring During Combat<sup>1</sup>

PIRET AVARMAA

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The threat of military attack against Estonia is currently low but we must nevertheless not discard the possibility that Russia might decide to attack the Baltic region. The civilian population still often bears the brunt of military conflicts, falling victim to attacks either directly or indirectly, and suffering the consequences of the damage to the infrastructure.

The article gives a brief overview of the development of military material which has

<sup>1</sup> The article is based on the master's thesis defended by the author in the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences in 2021.

led to increasingly dramatic consequences for the civilian population. The indirect fire which has caused a military revolution (and has been a hot topic during the ongoing war in Ukraine) means attacking a target outside one's line of sight, mainly with the use of artillery systems. Indirect fire includes mortars, artillery, rocket launchers, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, mortar being the first and the most modest indirect fire system among these.

It is impossible to predict the damage inflicted by indirect fire, as it depends on the warhead and fuse used, the point of impact, etc. Russia has used indirect fire systems in wars more as a rule than an exception ever since the 19th century, attacking both civilian targets as well as the population. Since the start of Russia's so-called special operation on 24 February this year, the history will remember the artillery barrage on Mariupol, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities, which has caused massive damage and civilian casualties. Russia has used guided missiles at the start of the current war in Ukraine. Their use has decreased over the course of the war because Russia is, in all likelihood, trying to save these for cases when the other means of indirect fire are not producing the desired effect.

The collateral damage from using state-of-the-art weapons and involving the population in warfare has created the need for defence measures, especially in light of warfare increasingly shifting to densely populated areas or urban centres. This is a topic that needs to be discussed in Estonia today. Our key protection measures are evacuation and sheltering. In case of a military threat, it would be impossible to evacuate the whole Ida-Viru County, and 57 percent of the residents would need to remain put. There would be no evacuations carried out among the populations of Narva, Narva-Jõesuu, and Sillamäe, which means that sheltering would remain their only option. As of today, Estonia is lacking special shelters or any kind of sheltering options in general.

There are no sites earmarked or prepared as long-term shelters. In this situation it makes sense to take shelter in basements of apartment buildings, which can be considered home shelters and as such are not publicly accessible. Consequently, the focus is put on public buildings that are in daily use and that can be utilised as public shelters in case of danger.

## Books and Articles for Better Coping on the Information War Front

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The library as the centre of reliable information has a relevant and necessary role in preventing the spread of disinformation and helping reach the evidence-based information. The National Library of Estonia is collecting literature on disinformation and information manipulation. We gather reviews of the research and analyses conducted in Estonia or by the Estonian researchers and analysts, share references to important and interesting studies, reports, and information collections. The National Library has ordered books that deal with fake news, information war and psychological war, propaganda, disinformation, politics and security. When we acquire literature on a topic, we also consult the specialists. We strive to have a wide network of partners from whom we get regular recommendations on materials

and who share with us their ideas on disinformation. In the current complicated times, security and the ongoing information war are the most important topics. In the article, we introduce useful sources: relevant books and web pages.

POLITICS

## Relations with Russia and Attempts to Overcome Communist Legacy<sup>2</sup>

TUNNE KELAM

Member of the European Parliament 2004–2019

The massive enlargement of the European Union in 2004 ushered in a fundamental change – eight out of the ten new Member States had felt the yoke of Communist totalitarianism. Yet, despite the Berlin Wall having been pulled down in 1989, this construction that had been built to separate European nations was still in its place in the mental plane of the reunited Europe of 15 years later. Recognising the role of Communism and analysing its nature felt a bit like walking across a minefield to most of our Western colleagues. It was becoming increasingly obvious that there was a huge contrast between the obligatory condemnation of Nazism and its symbols by the West, and the view of Communist legacy as something that had remained in the past, a domestic concern of each country.

The marginalisation of the Communist legacy and the reluctance to clearly express an opinion were also fuelled by the increasingly close partnership between the EU and Russia. It fell to the new members of the European Parliament (EP) to draw attention to Putin's Russia being the heir of the anti-West totalitarian Soviet Union. This

<sup>2</sup> This is the 4<sup>th</sup> and last instalment in the series of articles published by *Riigikogu Toimetised*, where the author reminisces on the first fifteen years as an Estonian MEP (see also *Riigikogu Toimetised* No 42, 43, 44).

meant that we had to constantly question how much we could trust Russia. In March 2005, the EP gave a sobering assessment to the current state of the EU-Russia relations in the so-called Malmström Report.

When President Putin organised a celebration to honour the Soviet historical narrative in Moscow on 9 May 2005, the EP responded with an initiative of its own. The EP acknowledged in so many words that for some nations the end of World War meant a new tyranny forced on them by the Soviet Union, and that Europe must be made aware of the Iron Curtain and the magnitude of suffering caused to the enslaved nations caught on the Eastern side of it. Together with several of my Baltic colleagues we managed to introduce certain moral conditions: there can be no reconciliation without an acknowledgement of the truth and remembering the past. Shaping the common European memory and historical narrative became the keywords of our efforts from then on.

The next step toward that objective turned out to be the Conference on European Conscience and Communism, organised by the Czech Senate in June 2008, which concluded with the Prague Declaration. The latter emphasised that Europe cannot be considered as united until Communism and Nazism have been recognised as equal and criminal legacies of the past. Europe-wide responsibility needs to be taken for the crimes of Communism.

The Prague Declaration became the basis for shaping the position of the EP. On 2 April 2009, the EP adopted the resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism. The initiators were particularly keen on two specific proposals: establishing the Platform of European Memory and Conscience to coordinate research into the legacy of totalitarianism and declaring 23 August the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Totalitarian Regimes. The EP recognised Nazi and Communist regimes as the common European legacy. The EP does not see

historical reconciliation as possible without truth and memory, and expects all totalitarian regimes to be viewed the same way.

Giving an educated international assessment to the Communist regime is not a question of the past. A decisive condemnation of the crimes of Nazi Germany ensured that a recent officer of Gestapo could not have become the Chancellor of the new Germany. The lack of a similar condemnation regarding the Soviet Union allowed the Soviet Gestapo Lieutenant Colonel Putin to become the dictator of Russia and the leader in the war against Ukraine. These catastrophic developments could have been avoided by setting the Soviet totalitarianism together with its criminal security apparatus on equal basis with the Hitler regime at the right moment.

#### STUDIES

### How to Recognise Manipulation? Digital Media Competence of Servicemen and Conscripts

ANDREAS VENTSEL

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In 2020–2021, the Department of Semiotics and the Institute of Social Studies of the University of Tartu conducted a research project with the aim of developing a prototype for the interactive web-based learning platform “Learn to Recognise Manipulation” (<https://mojutustehnikad.ee>) in order to improve the identification of information influence activities. The learning platform is first of all meant to be used by conscripts and servicemen who will be the primary target of hostile information influence activities during a hybrid war.

In order to get an overview of the

awareness of hostile information influence activities and potential challenges among the servicemen and conscripts, we used a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. In the quantitative analysis part, we conducted an electronic questionnaire to ascertain awareness of influencing. The qualitative analysis consisted of an analysis of (social) media texts where we identified the main messages of disinforming texts and the ways of constructing them.

Designing of the learning environment was based on three central principles of shaping the learning process:

#### Developing of media competence.

In putting together the learning tasks of the platform, we proceeded from the following aims of learning: developing the skill to find and access information in different media, the skill to analyse the messages presented in different media, the skill to judge the reliability of the messages sent out and the skill create new messages in different media.

#### Playfulness of the learning process.

In our learning environment prototype, we prepared several tasks that give the students the opportunity to test by themselves how to use information influence activities in creating messages in order to increase their ability to recognise hostile information influence activities in the future through this experience.

**Giving feedback in online environment.** In both the multiple-choice tests and the case analyses that require the students to give longer written answers, we have offered the students longer explanations and reasonings as feedback with which they can compare their answers. Feedback in the form of a dialogue should encourage the students to continue thinking about these issues independently.

On the basis of the results of the questionnaire and qualitative text analysis, we selected four topics to focus on in the learning tasks of the web platform.

**Disinformation.** In this part, the students learn to recognise more wide-spread

types of disinformation, to analyse different types of media content critically and to behave appropriately when they come into touch with possible disinformation.

**Polarisation.** Here the students learn about the main verbal and pictorial means that are used to create tensions between different social groups and to strengthen division.

**Belittling and discrediting opponents.** In this part, students are taught to identify rhetoric strategies that foreign influencers may use in the press or social media to discredit the Constitution of Estonia, the Estonian Defence Forces or NATO.

**False identities,** where we focused mainly on the so-called bots in creating the tasks. Here the students learn to understand how bots are used in information influence activities, and identify the bots and false identities used in social media.

### Natural Biodiversity in Agricultural Landscapes: An Important Component of Sustainable Food Production

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The intensification of agricultural land use that took place during the last century has led to an extensive decline in biodiversity. Intensive agriculture affects the biodiversity of different species groups (including soil fauna) both through habitat fragmentation and loss, and through the use of harmful agricultural practices. The increase field massifs, the simplification of agricultural landscapes and the loss of various natural and semi-natural landscape features, together with mineral fertilisers

and pesticides leaking into the environment, are the main causes of biodiversity loss in agricultural landscapes.

Along with the loss of biodiversity, many of the benefits provided by nature, or the ecosystem services, that are essential for sustainable food production, including pollination and natural pest control potential, as well as other ecosystem functions related to biodiversity, such as prevention of nutrient leaching, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, enhancement of carbon sequestration in fields and grasslands, and erosion control, have become threatened. Within the framework of the RITA research project “Natural Biodiversity in Agricultural Landscapes”, researchers from the University of Tartu provided an overview of the main factors affecting the biodiversity of agricultural lands and prepared a package of recommendations on measures for restoring biodiversity, various ecosystem services and soil health in fields and grasslands. The research showed that there is a wide range of agroecological activities and practices that are neither costly nor difficult to implement, but could improve the biodiversity situation in both conventional agriculture and organic farming, and also contribute to the preservation of essential environmental benefits in agricultural landscapes.

## What will the Estonian Bioeconomy Be Like in 2050?

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The direct impact of the biotechnology applications already visible today could amount to 2–4 trillion euro (c. 5% of the global GDP) in the coming 10–20 years, according to the estimation of McKinsey.

Bioeconomy has a significant potential to increase also the welfare of Estonia and to raise living standard. At the same time, we do not know yet what the future of global trade will be like in the coming decades, how rapidly biotechnology will be taken into use and what the international agreements on climate neutrality, protection of biodiversity, etc. will be like.

The scenario analysis of the long-term development opportunities of Estonian bioeconomy helps prepare for very different possible future developments. We analyse what opportunities for development the Estonian bioeconomy will have in a more open and in a more self-centred international situation. We will discuss how to embrace the entirely new technological and socio-economic opportunities associated with the bio-revolution, how to compete in export markets and keep pace with technology, and what to do if, for one reason or another, promising new opportunities offered by biosciences and biotechnology do not materialise.

The first scenario, bioeconomy that ensures secure self-reliance, is characterised by global economic uncertainty and the need to ensure self-sufficiency in essential products. In the second, globalised and traditional bioeconomy scenario, open trade and movement of capital offer opportunities for the Estonian bioeconomy to seek a better place in the global division of labour. In the third scenario, a global economy shaken by bio-revolution, biotechnology is changing the existing ways of using biomass to a large extent, leading to entirely new areas, products and services in bioeconomy. In the fourth scenario, environmentally-conscious and community-based adaptation to bio-revolution, Europe is seeking a balance between the implementation of novel biotechnology and the preservation of traditional eco- and food systems.

Keeping in mind the uncertain external environment, it would be wrong to try to decide which scenario we would prefer in

the first place. However, we highlight the main strategic breakthroughs trends that will enable the Estonian bioeconomy to grow successfully in any scenario.

- ▶ For the productivity of workforce and the standard of living in Estonia to approach that of the Nordic countries or Germany, the share of more sophisticated products has to increase in Estonia’s exports. In the context of Estonian bioeconomy, this is expected to require investments reaching billions of euros in the development of chemical processing of wood, (bio) pharmaceuticals industry and ICT solutions supporting bioeconomy.
- ▶ As an absolute minimum, the Estonian research and higher education must follow what is happening on the forefront of biosciences and biotechnologies, and develop the capability to rapidly adopt and further develop technologies created elsewhere.
- ▶ For Estonia, maintaining and developing effective cooperation with the Nordic Countries and with Germany, Poland and the Baltic States is vital from the point of view of ensuring mutual access to markets, security of supply for (bio)economy, energy security and investment protection.

## Youth Centered Approach and Its Application Model N-TELG<sup>3</sup>

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Specialist literature qualifies the forms and quality of activities that are needed and appropriate for young people with terms like *youth-friendly*, *youth-focused*, *youth-centered*, and *youth-responsive*. Yet the concept of “youth-centeredness” or “youth-centered approach” has not been conceptualised unambiguously in the context of services or activities offered to young people. And although youth-centered approach has not been clearly defined in research literature, young people are treated as fully formed individuals with rights and active agency in shaping their lives.

The youth work research group in the Narva College of the University of Tartu conceptualised the theoretical fundamental principles of youth-centered approach on the basis of research literature and created a model for applying the youth-centered approach (N-TELG).

The youth-centered approach brings together different components: *consistent ensuring of the rights of young people, real participation of young people, respect for young people, acknowledging the values, and an empowering environment*, as well as the key elements that clarify and specify these. The relevance of this theoretical concept in the Estonian context was confirmed through in-depth interviews with experts in the field of youth work.

The focus group interviews with shapers of youth policy, youth workers, and young people taking part in open youth work showed that the theoretical concept of youth-centered approach plays a key role in open youth work in Estonia. Interviewees from all the groups were able to link the five main components of the youth-centered approach to their own experiences in this field.

N-TELG is not a model that prescribes the end result; instead, it aims to go much further through its focus on achieving and supporting sustainable functioning, which would allow an enhanced practical application of youth-centeredness to services and activities provided to young people. The model outlines what kind of discretionary decisions are made while working with young people, to what extent the components of the youth-centered approach are taken into account while making such decisions, and how to improve the considerations, arguments, and quality behind these assessments that form the foundation for these decisions. The model explains the provision of services and the organisation of activities for young people as a sequence of carefully considered discretionary decisions made by specialists who work with young people. The model outlines the process of analysis behind discretionary decisions, which helps to reduce decision noise and nudges towards more youth-centered choices via the choice architecture. The N-TELG process consists in a collection of sequenced actions, i.e. measures: decision-making audit, assessment of decision noise, analysis of the youth-centered approach, making choices, implementing changes.

When using the model in practice, the specialists, their organisations, or service providers who offer services to young people apply the youth-centered approach.

## Tax System Is Under Pressure

**MAGNUS PIIRITS**

*Foresight Centre, Expert*

Estonia's tax system was established in 1994. Its salient features are simplicity and emphasis on economic growth, and it includes few exceptions. In 2019, the general tax burden in Estonia was 33.1%

of the GDP (EUR 9.4 billion). Compared to countries around the world, our tax burden places us in the upper quarter; however, in the European context, we are in the lower quarter.

In the future, the tax system will be affected by the ageing population which increases the pressure on social protection. In addition, the spreading of work in company forms impacts social tax revenue by reducing taxes on labour. Although the inequality of incomes has decreased in Estonia over the recent years, asset inequality has increased, threatening long-term economic growth and tax revenue. All the while, the spreading of digital economy offers to the tax system new opportunities to make tax decisions faster with lower administrative costs and better targeting. The fifth major factor is the climate change, with its combating measures bringing in temporary additional tax revenue.

While developing a future-proof tax structure, we created three scenarios based on development trends.

The scenario "Digital World" asked how the tax system could be adapted to the digital age. The long-term goal in this scenario is to eliminate social tax altogether and to transfer the funding of social protection to sources that take the growing diversity of revenues better into account. Digital economy and start-up companies whose main asset is highly qualified workforce welcome the lowering of the social tax burden; on the other hand, they have to reckon with the growth of the income tax burden to fund the social budget of the state.

The scenario "Equal Start" asked how the tax system should react to the growing inequality. Many trends of the economic environment, such as the increasing price of assets and the rapid development of digital economy has tended to benefit mostly owners of real estate and financial assets over a longer period of time, thus increasing asset inequality. This trend is

further exacerbated by money-printing and negative interest rates. Deepening inequality feeds dissatisfaction and protest which blocks the reforms and projects that are directed at economic development, to the detriment of economic growth. This scenario projects the introduction of progressive income tax and the creation of a two-component property tax: 1) tax on real estate, and 2) tax on other property.

The scenario "Environmental Crisis" asked how the tax system can be brought into conformity with the green transition. Opting for this trend means that the society sees the fight against climate change as the biggest challenge facing Estonia. We need to understand that environmental taxes cannot be the source of long-term tax revenue. When ecologically harmful practices become less prevalent, the budget revenue decreases as well. The scenario introduced a three-level car tax as one of the changes in taxation.

In real life, countries are facing all these questions at once, not one-by-one, and different scenarios must be combined. But outlining the so-called clean scenarios allows us to better understand the pros and cons of each one, as well as the tensions between different development choices.

## Funding Long-term Care. Why, How And for Whom?

**LENNO UUSKÜLA**

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Long-term care covers various social and health care services. According to a recent survey, there are 160,900–190,500 people living in Estonia who use outside help to cope in their daily lives. A study conducted in the USA found that a half of the people

who are 65 years old at present will need long-term care services at some point in the future. The amounts of money needed for that are very large, many people cannot afford it, and from the point of view of society, such spending is ineffective. Thus, long-term care is a huge and costly risk, and managing it is essential for the quality of life of each person and their close ones.

The primary aim of funding long-term care services is covering the risk of individual long-term care services and costs for each person, not redistributing resources within society. Redistribution provides equal services to everyone, regardless of their ability and willingness to contribute to the system during their lifespan. In Estonia, long-term care is mainly provided by families and close ones. It is a large expense for society if people have to be carers because of need, and not by their free will. In the future, the role of professional and financed services will increase, as will the volume of services connected with technology.

The Foresight Centre has drawn up four development scenarios that show how the funding of long-term care may develop in Estonia and what services can be provided. If the present system continues, Estonia will reach the scenario "SOS", where both public and private sector funding is small and a large part of the risk will have to be borne by the person needing assistance.

If, however, the state is actively engaged in increasing the active responsibility of the people themselves, we will have the scenario "Money. Money. Money". The total funding is larger because people have become aware of the risk of long-term care; a system has been created where it is possible to stand for one's own welfare. In the scenario "The Winner Takes It All", the state deals only with developing the public sector funding.

In the scenario "People Need Love", private and public funding develop equally. The total funding is large, and this is the

system that is the closest to the current situation. Although all systems have their own positive and negative aspects, the least preferred is the system closest to the current situation.

The Foresight Centre's report on the future of long-term care suggests five solutions for improving the funding of long-term care during the next 15 years, starting from increasing funding by the state (from three sources), while creating a suitable environment for the increasing contributions of private sector (two sources) that in the future limit the share of state expenses.

1. A long-term care insurance will be created that is financed from household incomes or real estate tax.
2. In 15 years, the general budget of the public sector could contribute nearly in the same order as specialised insurance. That would ensure minimal protection to all people, would not depend on a specific tax base, and enables flexibility in the state budget.
3. Separate funds must be included in the social security budget for the people who are unable to finance their own contributions.
4. People's own resources as self-financing that will be covered from savings.
5. Insurance contracts and solutions relating to real estate, including reverse mortgages, that can also be linked to insurance cover.

VARIA

## Science for Policy in Estonia: Current Situation, Opportunities, Perspectives

TARMO SOOMERE

*President of the Estonian Academy of Sciences*

The strategic branches of the contacts between the science landscape and the

state are the (national) policy for science and science for policy. In Estonia, the shaping and implementation of policy for science has been resolved at the level of legislation, distribution of mandates, various mechanisms and also best practices. Science for policy, however, is not defined at the level of law. It includes a set of measures and institutions through which the knowledge accumulated in the academic community is consolidated into a component of political and economic decision-making processes.

The mechanism of science for policy has been established as a state institution mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In different countries, it is organised differently and plays a different role. The European Commission is supported by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM). The science for policy ecosystem in Estonia is made up of three national level institutions: the Research and Development Council, the Foresight Centre and the Academy of Sciences. The Government, the President and the ministries are supported by research advisers and several specialised institutions. *Ad hoc* advisory councils, like the Scientific Advisory Board for COVID-19 Prevention that consists of top-level scientists and experts, have a major role.

From an external (JRC) point of view, science for policy in Estonia mainly functions in a fragmented, non-institutionalised form. The personal contacts of society's leading figures and top scientists play a significant role. The main bottlenecks are the widespread fragmentation of the whole system (in the context of both the academic community and the policy level), the modest support from the ministries and the lack of specialists with the necessary competences. Therefore, the message of scientists is often of low priority.

The leading researchers of the European Commission are of the opinion that the advice should be based on the best knowledge, be public and transparent

and come from an authorised adviser. The principle of openness of advice is in conflict with the Constitution of Estonia: the sittings of the Government are closed unless the Government decides otherwise. The materials presented to the Government also do not have to be public.

The JRC analysis sends a clear signal that the system of science for policy in Estonia needs both resources and a mandate. Creation of a completely new structure does not seem reasonable. Most probably, clarifying of the roles and mandates and coordination of the existing forms and institutions will be sufficient. It would be sensible to regulate how advisory councils are set up, both in normal situations and in situations requiring an operational response: what their mandate, responsibilities and forms of work, as well as how publicity and communication of advice are organised. The Netherlands model is recommended as a possible example. In its scientific advisory board on Government policies, formed of research practitioners, social, economic and legal researchers have an important role. As an alternative, the JRC analysis recommends considering institutionalisation of the initiative coming from the research community and scientific institutions.

## Quo Vadis, Academy of Security Sciences?

TRIINU KALDOJA

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The Academy of Security Sciences is the starting point of Estonia's security. It is a school for hopeful or already active rescue officers, rescue organisers, police officers, prison or customs officers, or researchers in the field.

The studies as well as the research and development work take place in four colleges and the Internal Security Institute of the Academy. Specialised professionals are educated in the Rescue College, Financial College, College of Justice, and Police and Border Guard College, while the Internal Security Institute offers master's degree programmes. In total, the Academy has nearly 1,000 students each year, with 10,000 taking part in its in-service training courses.

The Academy of Security Sciences is governed by the Ministry of the Interior and is unique in the global context because all the studies regarding internal security in Estonia have been brought under one organisation. The Academy has a vision of becoming the best study and research centre of internal security in Europe by 2025. For this end, it is making efforts to ensure the best quality of studies with strong emphasis on methodology, requesting and assessing feedback, innovation, and applied research.

One of the key fields of research and development is creating innovative solutions for learning.

In future education, simulation-based methods, blended learning, micro-degrees, crash courses offered in non-traditional conditions, international studies, and other innovative solutions will play an important role.

The Remote Monitoring Research and Development Centre was established four years ago with the goal of becoming the central national competence centre in the field of unmanned robotic systems and creating the conditions for the integration of research and development results into the services and education of the field, as well as offering formal and continuing education.

The Academy of Security Sciences carries a heavy and challenge-filled responsibility to serve the Estonian society by developing the field of internal security on the basis of research and evidence.