The role of incentive design and political capital in parliamentary anti-corruption programmes *
The “first wave” of donor-sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human capital) in anti-corruption.
Now it is time for these programmes to take into account parliamentary incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this “knowledge.” This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory-practice gap.
*This paper was presented in 6th Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, 31.07-01.08.2004, Wroxton College, UK. Policy Paper: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat1663/Publications/Presentations/Parliamentary%20Policy%20Brief.pdf